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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current United States (―U.S.‖) administration faces an unre-
solved legal problem in the so-called war on terrorism.  The problem is 
what to do with Guantanamo detainees: whether to try some of them in 
federal courts; create a national security court to deal with cases involv-
ing the sensitive intelligence information; or release others.
1
  Meanwhile, 
some of the key architects of the September 11 attacks, including Khalid 
Shaikh Mohammed, are scheduled to appear before a civilian court in 
New York.
2
  This move of the Obama administration has been lauded by 
                                            
 Senior Research Associate, Institute of State and Law, Georgian Academy of 
Sciences. This contribution is based on a presentation given at the symposium "Compara-
tive Constitutional Law: National Security Across the Globe," which took place at Pace 
Law School on November 13, 2009. The presentation form is essentially maintained. The 
author would like to thank Dr. Helmut Aust for his comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. Any errors are mine. 
1 Kelli Arena, Obama Team Ponders What to Do with Guantanamo Inmates, CNN 
NEWS, Nov. 10, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POL-
ITICS/11/10/obama.transition.guantanamo/index.html.   
2 Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind before Civilian Court in New 
York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at 1. 
138 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 1:9 2010] 
 
many observers
3
 while criticized by others.
4
  While the initial plan to try 
alleged terrorists in ordinary criminal courts is still under review at the 
time of writing,
5
 the future prospects of a fair civilian trial remain uncer-
tain at best for hundreds of detained terror suspects.  
What is a proper venue for trying terrorism detainees?  Policymak-
ers and academia alike have been discussing the creation of a distinct 
system of special courts as adjudicatory instances
6
 or courts supervising 
a new preventive detention system.
7
  Legal scholars have considered ex-
tending the military detention paradigm to new special courts or creating 
a hybrid system of national security courts, which would combine ele-
ments of ordinary criminal justice applicable within a ―peacetime‖ legal 
order with attributes of military justice as applied in wartime.
8
  
One justification for the establishment of specialized courts trying 
alleged terrorists is the failure of the criminal justice system to deal with 
                                            
3 Editorial, A Return to American Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, at 22; Editorial, Ter-
rorism on Trial; There are Good Reasons to Try Khalid Sheik Mohammed in New York, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2009, at A20; Chris Smith, Trying Question: Why Putting Khalid 
Sheik Mohamed on Trial Downtown is the Right Thing for the U.S. – and the City. (And if 
Rudy Were Still U.S. Prosecutor, He’d Agree.), Nov. 20, 2009, N.Y. MAG., available at 
http://nymag.com/news/politics/citypolitic/62255/.  
4 Editorial, KSM Hits Manhattan – Again: Eric Holder’s Decision to Move a Trial 
on War Crimes to American Soil is Morally Confused, Dangerous and Political a Fault, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2009, at 14; Giuliani Criticizes Terror Trials in New York, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/16/us/politics/16giuliani.html; Bloomberg: Try 9/11 
Mastermind Somewhere Else, N.Y. POST, Jan. 28, 2010, available at 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattan/mike_try_1w1hLYpkm0FihEHooEqUd
N; Peter Beaumont, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Trial Poses Huge Challenges for US Ju-
diciary, GUARDIAN, Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.guard-ian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/13/911-
mastermind-trial-challenges-analysis. 
5 US to Decide on Where to Try Alleged 9/11 Plotters “In Weeks”, Holder Says, 
N.Y. POST, Apr. 8, 2010. 
6 GLENN SULMASY, NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM – A NATURAL EVOLUTION 
OF JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2009).  
7 Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, 
at 19; see also BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN 
THE AGE OF TERROR (2008).  For possible obstacles for a transition to national security 
courts, see Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond Guantánamo, Obstacles and Options, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 29 (2008), 
8 Amos N. Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for the Deten-
tion of Terrorists, 19 FLA. J. INT’L L. 511-30 (2007) [hereinafter Guiora, Quirin to Ham-
dan].  For security-based detention in armed conflict see Jelena Pejic, Procedural Prin-
ciples and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and 
Other Situations of Violence, 85 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, 375-91 (2005). 
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terrorism suspects.  The exigencies of an emergency situation, which 
may be triggered by terrorist attacks, can indeed create difficulties for 
ordinary courts in dealing with terrorism, but such is highly circums-
tance-dependent.  Further, any general assumption that criminal courts 
are unable to deal with terrorism offences presupposes that the alleged 
terrorists, as a matter of principle, do not qualify as ordinary criminals.  
This presupposition is tied to two fundamental issues: who are the terror-
ists; and what is the distinction to be made between criminals and terror-
ists?  The proponents of special terrorism courts do not seem to have 
compelling answers to these questions and are often focused on the 
strand of issues relating to the procedural difficulties of the criminal jus-
tice system in terrorism trials.  According to this view, ordinary civilian 
courts are not a proper venue for prosecuting terrorism suspects because 
of their incapability to deal with sensitive information
9
 and because of 
the need to protect witnesses.  From this perspective, it could be argued 
that another (―hybrid‖10) legal paradigm is needed.11  However, these ar-
guments are not persuasive; their proponents have not shown so far that 
the criminal justice definitely failed
12
 or that the same goal of providing 
procedural ―comfort‖ in terrorism trials cannot be achieved through ad-
justments to existing criminal justice systems.  
I would like to offer the reader a European perspective on this issue.  
Accordingly, my paper will address the question as to whether and to 
                                            
9 On the secrecy issue see Serrin Turner & Stephen J. Schulhofer, THE SECRECY 
PROBLEM IN TERRORISM TRIALS, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCHOOL OF 
LAW, available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/2941d4bea-7c3c450d2_4sm6iy66c.pdf.  
10 Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan, supra note 8. 
11 See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Military Commissions and National Security Courts 
after Guantanamo, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2008) [hereinafter Guiora, Military Commis-
sions]. ―Precisely because the individuals I refer as ―post 9/11 detainees‖ are neither 
criminals under the traditional criminal law paradigm nor prisoners of war according to 
international law, we must establish a legal definition of ―detainee‖ so that we may de-
termine the rights and privileges to accord them.‖ 
12 Contra Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: 2009 UPDATE AND RECENT 
DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, July 2009, available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090723-LS-in-pursuit-justice-09-update.pdf; THE 
CASE AGAINST A SPECIAL TERRORISM COURT: POLICY PAPER, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 
March 2009, available at http://www.humanrights-first.org/pdf/090323-LS-nsc-policy-
paper.pdf. See also Andrew Cohen, A Terrorism Trial’s Myths, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 
2009, at A15.   
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what extent the creation and operation of a distinct system of security 
courts supervising preventive detention of terror suspects would be com-
patible with the European Convention of Human Rights (―ECHR‖).  The 
procedural and institutional guarantees for independent and impartial jus-
tice systems created by the ECHR may impose considerable legal con-
straints on creating a distinct system of security courts in Europe.  More-
over, problems may also arise with regard to certain procedural aspects 
of the operation of such courts when seen in the light of the ECHR.  In 
addition, the ECHR does not fully recognize one of the rationales for the 
creation and operation of a system of special terrorism courts, namely 
preventive detention for security purposes. Although such detention is 
not forbidden by the ECHR in absolute terms and can be permissible in 
emergency situations, nevertheless the general requirement of overall 
fairness in proceedings under the ECHR, even in times of emergency, 
limits the application of preventive security-based detention.  
I argue in this paper that terrorist suspects should not be seen as 
non-prosecutable detainees because such a view undercuts general pro-
cedural fairness and compromises individual liberty.  The ECHR allows 
Contracting States to keep their flexibility in their fight against terrorism 
through the means of the traditional criminal justice.  Therefore, the rea-
sonableness of the creation of a special court system dealing with terror-
ism cases and the application of relaxed procedures in terrorism trials 
should be considered carefully not only in peacetime, but also in emer-
gencies. 
II. GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
 Article 5(1) of the ECHR determines that ―[e]veryone has the right 
to liberty and security of person.  No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure pre-
scribed by law . . . .‖  There are six grounds for detention in Article 
5(1),
13
 and preventive security detention is not among them.
 14
  Under the 
                                            
13 The European Convention of Human Rights art. 5 (Nov. 4, 1950), available at 
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#C.Art5 (last visited Mar. 12, 2010) [hereinafter 
ECHR]. Article 5(1) allows a deprivation of liberty to be justified in the following cases: 
―a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;  
 b. the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful 
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed 
by law; 
NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE   
                                                                                                141 
 
ECHR, detention is only permissible after conviction by a competent 
court or while awaiting trial.
15
  Although Article 5(1)(c) authorizes de-
tention ―when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent commit-
ting an offence,‖ this provision is only applicable in detention for crimi-
nal law purposes.   Terrorism suspects may also be detained under the 
same Article 5(1)(c) on reasonable suspicion of having committed an of-
fense.
16
  The ECHR, however, does not permit detention for general 
crime prevention or gathering information; there must always be a link to 
criminal proceedings.
17
  Even the very serious public concerns regarding 
terrorism would not justify an indefinite deprivation of liberty without 
prospect of a fair trial.  In A. and Others v. United Kingdom,18 the Court 
reaffirmed that ―paragraphs (a) to (f) amount to an exhaustive list of ex-
ceptions and that only a narrow interpretation of these exceptions is 
compatible with the aims of Article 5 [of the ECHR].‖19  Thus, a purely 
security-based detention of terrorism suspects would not be permissible 
                                                                                                  
c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing 
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent 
his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; 
d. the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational su-
pervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority; 
e. the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infec-
tious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or va-
grants; [and] 
f. the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unautho-
rized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken 
with a view to deportation or extradition.‖  
14 For an overview, see Helena Cook, Preventive Detention – International Stan-
dards and the Protection of the Individual, in PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 1-52 (Stansilaw Frankowski & Dinah Shelton 
eds., 1992); Despina Chatzivassiliou, The Guarantees of Judicial Control with Respect to 
Deprivation of Liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights: An 
Overview of the Strasbourg Case-Law, 5 ERA-FORUM 4, 499-519 (Dec. 2004), 
http://www.spr-ingerlink.com/content/y5pl46u146223q70/fulltext.pdf.  
15 Supra note 13. 
16 Id. lit. c.   
17 See Ciulla v. Italy, 148 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 38 (1989); see also Brogan & 
Others v. United Kingdom, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 53 (1988).    
18 A. & Others v. United Kingdom, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R.   
19 Id. ¶ 171.  See Sangeeta Shah, From Westminster to Strasbourg: A. and Others v. 
United Kingdom, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 473 (2009). 
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under the Convention’s ―peacetime‖ legal regime.  
Is preventive detention lawful in times of emergency?  According to 
Article 15 (1)
20
:  
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obliga-
tions under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its 
other obligations under international law.  
First, it must be emphasized that recourse to the emergency deroga-
tion provision in Article 15 is seldom made.  Although the terrorism 
threat may amount to a public emergency under the Convention,
21
 there 
is no need to rely on an emergency legal regime in the majority of cases 
involving terrorist threats.  Contracting States possess enough flexibility 
under the ECHR to adjust their criminal law to the contemporary chal-
lenges of terrorism through, for example, extending pre-charge detention 
powers.  The European Court of Human Rights (―ECtHR‖), however, 
sets limits to such adjustments based on Articles 5 and 6, which indicate 
that pre-trial detention of terrorism suspects must not exceed certain lim-
its, namely the appropriate time limit for pre-charge detention,
22
 and the 
principle of overall fairness in proceedings must be upheld.  
A government’s valid derogation under Article 15 may preclude the 
unlawfulness of a preventive detention, which is tied to the primary issue 
of what circumstances justify the proclamation of a public emergency.  
The existence of a public emergency falls under the ECtHR’s margin of 
appreciation doctrine, which indicates that states have considerable lee-
                                            
20 See DAVID J. HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE & COLIN WARBRICK, LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 617 (2d ed. 2009). 
21 In A. & Others v. United Kingdom, the Court agreed with the House of Lords that 
there was ―an emergency threatening the life of the nation‖ for the purposes of Article 15.  
A. & Others, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 181.  While doing so, the Court interpreted the criteria 
already elaborated in the Greek Case for an emergency threatening the life of the nation 
and arrived at the conclusion that the margin of appreciation of state authorities shall not 
be significantly restricted and terrorism may well constitute a threat to the life of the na-
tion within the meaning of Article 15. See id. ¶¶ 173, 176, 179-181. 
22 The Court ruled in the Brogan & Others judgment that, unless there is a valid 
derogation under Article 15 ECHR, any excess of four days of police custody, even in the 
most exceptional circumstances, including the fights against terrorism, constitutes a vio-
lation of Article 5(3).  See Brogan & Others v. United Kingdom, 1988 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 
62. 
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way as to the preconditions of the situation,
23
 but any derogation from 
individual liberty must be strictly required by the exigencies of the emer-
gency.
24
  Although the ECtHR has been criticized for its deferential ap-
proach to the admissibility of emergency derogations from Convention 
rights, the Strasbourg Court has not been leaving Contracting States an 
unlimited discretion with regard to measures that are acceptable in cases 
of terrorist threats.
25
 A relatively recent confirmation of the ECtHR’s de-
ferential approach is that the Court (once again) lowered the threshold 
for the proclamation of a public emergency in A. and Others v United 
Kingdom when it disagreed with Lord Hoffman in the Belmarsh case.26  
Lord Hoffman argued that a terrorism threat does not necessarily put the 
life of the nation into question and therefore, it does not deserve to be 
seen as an emergency within the meaning of Article 15 of the ECHR.
27
  
Contrary to this view, the Court, however, emphasized that ―[t]he re-
quirement of imminence [of future terrorist attacks] cannot be interpreted 
so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before tak-
ing measures to deal with it.‖28  This means that the Contracting States 
are allowed to take comprehensive measures with a view to preventing 
future terrorist threats from materializing.  In any case, the Court contin-
ues to require that the nature of the particular threat be demonstrated and 
the proportionality of the response be established.  
                                            
23 See Ireland v. U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 207 (1978); Brannigan & McBride 
v. United Kingdom, 258-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 43 (1993).  
24 See Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 207; see also Aksoy, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 68. 
25 In Klass & Others v. Germany, the Court stated that ―[i]t is certainly not for the 
Court to substitute for the assessment of the national authorities any other assessment of 
what might be the best policy in this field.  Nevertheless, the Court stresses that this does 
not mean that the Contracting States enjoy an unlimited discretion . . . .  The Court, being 
aware of the danger such a law poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on 
the ground of defending it, affirms that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the 
struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropri-
ate.‖ 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 49 (1979) (internal citation omitted); see also Brannigan 
& McBride, 258-B Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 43. 
26 See A. & Others, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 177.  
27 See A. & Others v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, ¶ 97 (ap-
peal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).  In 2004 the House of Lords ruled that § 23 of the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 was not compatible with the ECHR because 
denying people their liberty indefinitely was disproportionate to the existing threat and 
limiting indefinite detention to non-British people was racially discriminatory. See id. ¶¶ 
68, 90, 95. 
28 A. & Others, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 177. 
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The ECtHR has dealt with the issue of detention for security pur-
poses on several occasions and has determined preconditions for such de-
tentions.  In Lawless v. Ireland, the Court concluded that the administra-
tive detention of individuals suspected of intending to take part in 
terrorist activities appeared to be a measure required by the circums-
tances of the emergency, which was proclaimed by the Irish Government 
in July 1957.  The Court concluded that the ―military, secret and terrorist 
character‖ of the IRA, ―the fear they created among the population,‖ and 
―the fact that these groups operated mainly in Northern Ireland, [with] 
their activities in the Republic of Ireland being virtually limited to the 
preparation of armed raids across the border,‖ caused ―great difficulties‖ 
in ―amassing . . . the evidence [required] to convict persons involved in 
activities of the IRA and its splinter groups.‖29  At the same time, the 
Court found that other less restrictive means could not achieve the same 
goal of preventing terrorist acts.
30
  In addition, the Court noted that the 
Offences against the State (Amendment) Act of 1940, which instituted 
administrative detention for counter-terrorism purposes, provided safe-
guards designed to prevent abuses in the operation of the administrative 
detention system.
31
  Such safeguards included a constant supervision by 
Parliament, the establishment of a Detention Commission including an 
officer of the Defence Forces and two judges, and the power of ordinary 
courts to ―compel the Detention Commission to carry out its functions.‖32  
In Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom,33 the Court upheld British 
detentions of terrorists in Northern Ireland for periods of up to seven 
days without judicial control.
34
  The Court emphasized the availability of 
safeguards, especially the detainee’s access to habeas corpus.35  In Aksoy 
v. Turkey, however, the Court found that a detention of fourteen days 
without judicial supervision was ―exceptionally long, and left the appli-
                                            
29 Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 1961 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 36. 
30 Sealing the border would have imposed ―extremely serious repercussions on the 
population as a whole.‖ Id.  
31 In this context, it has been emphasized that a ―detention commission‖ had been set 
up, which could hear complaints from detainees and, if necessary, release them. Moreo-
ver, the ordinary courts supervised over the Detention Commission.  See id. ¶ 37. 
32 Id.  
33 Brannigan & McBride, 258-B  Eur. Ct. H.R.   
34 See Susan Marks, Civil Liberties at the Margin: the UK Derogation and the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights, 15 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 69 (1995). 
35 Brannigan & McBride, 258-B Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 26-28. 
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cant vulnerable not only to arbitrary interference with his right to liberty 
but also to torture.‖36  In addition, the Court emphasized that ―the Gov-
ernment have [sic] not adduced any detailed reasons . . . as to why the 
fight against terrorism in South-East Turkey rendered judicial interven-
tion impracticable.‖37  Moreover, the Court considered that ―in this case 
insufficient safeguards were available to the applicant . . . .  In particular, 
the denial of access to a lawyer, doctor, relative or friend and the absence 
of any realistic possibility of being brought before a court to test the le-
gality of the detention meant that he was left completely at the mercy of 
those holding him.‖38 Thus, any restrictive measure taken must constitute 
a genuine response to the emergency situation, which may imply the ina-
bility of the ordinary criminal justice system to deal with terrorism under 
the given circumstances.  In any case, it must be determined whether sa-
feguards have been put in place to protect individuals against abuses of 
emergency powers.  
III.   PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES IN ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE ECHR 
Once preventive detention is considered to be a measure strictly re-
quired by the exigencies of the case, the institutional and procedural un-
derpinnings required to protect the individual’s right to a fair trial to the 
greatest extent possible should be put in place.  There must be an oppor-
tunity for terrorism suspects to challenge their detention in court pursuant 
to Article 5(4) of the ECHR: ―[e]veryone who is deprived of his liberty 
by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the 
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his 
release ordered if the detention is not lawful.‖39  
1. Judicial Independence as a Requirement for Procedural Fairness  
The use of preventive detention as a counter-terrorist measure or ad-
                                            
36 Aksoy, 1996 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 78. 
37 Id.  In Demir & Others v. Turkey, the Court regarded sixteen to twenty-three days 
incommunicado detention without judicial supervision as not justified under derogation 
from Article 5. 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 56-58. Similarly, in Nuray Sen v. Turkey eleven 
days detention without judicial supervision was seen as not justified under derogation 
from Article 5, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 22-29. 
38 Aksoy, 1996 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 83. 
39 ECHR, supra note 13, art. 5(4). 
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justments to criminal justice systems in Europe have seldom resulted in 
the creation of a distinct system of terrorism courts.
40
  When a state de-
cides to establish a special terrorism tribunal supervising preventive se-
curity detentions, what form should the court take?  The ECtHR does not 
specify the type of court in which a detainee can contest the lawfulness 
of his/her detention. The special tribunal does not have to be a court con-
stituting part of the judicial system. The term refers to bodies which ex-
hibit not only common fundamental features, of which most important is 
independence of the executive and the parties to the case, but also the 
guarantees of a judicial procedure appropriate to the kind of deprivation 
of liberty in question.
41
   
The ECtHR must ascertain whether the manner in which courts 
function can infringe on the detainee’s right to the overall fairness of 
proceedings.  Specialized courts may be susceptible to executive influ-
ence in a way that ordinary judges are not.  Such concerns may be raised 
especially with regard to the participation of military personnel in special 
courts.  When dealing with the operation of the State Security Courts in 
Turkey, which until 1999 included military officers, the ECtHR empha-
sized that the defendant was justified in fearing that the court would al-
low itself to be unduly influenced by considerations unrelated to the na-
ture of the case.
42
  
                                            
40 France created a magistrate system dealing with terrorism, as part of its 1986 
counterterrorist legislation. Judges acquired the competence to order preventive detention 
for up to six days.  The Diplock courts in the U. K. that tried members of the IRA were 
instituted by the Northern Ireland emergency legislation.  These courts have been criti-
cized as arbitrary. They were abolished in 2007 following the success of the peace proc-
ess. State Security Courts in Turkey based on 1982 Constitution dealt with crimes against 
the state security including terrorism. The military involvement in court proceedings has 
been regarded by the ECtHR as a violation of the fair trial standards of Article 6 ECHR. 
In 1999, the Government made the court civilian-run.  The SSC were abolished in 2004 
as part of Turkey’s efforts to join the EU.  For an overview, see GLEN SULMASY, THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM 158 (2009).  
41 Hutchison Reid v. U.K, 2003 IV-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 64. 
42 Altay, 1996 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 72-75. It should be noted in this context that some 
European States have expressed reluctance to extradite persons to the U.S. if they are to 
be tried before a military tribunal – the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany concerning the extradition of two Yemenites to the USA is worth mentioning. 
The U.S. agreement that neither suspect would be detained at Guantanamo played a cen-
tral role in the final outcome of proceedings. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 
[federal constitutional court] Nov. 5, 2003, 2 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1243/03 (F.R.G.), available at 
http://www.bundesverfass-
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A specialized court, consisting of civilian judges and based on ap-
propriate institutional underpinnings, may satisfy the requirements of ju-
dicial independence and constitute a competent court within the meaning 
of the ECHR.  The most problematic issue in this context would be the 
extent of limitations imposed on the guarantees of procedural fairness in 
such courts in the name of public security, which may undermine the ex-
isting (properly functioning) system of ordinary criminal justice – under 
certain circumstances and especially in times of stress, the government 
may be induced to rely heavily upon special courts. In such situations the 
extent to which an individual is protected within an ordinary criminal 
justice system can be significantly modified in a special court.   
2. Setting Standards for the Extent and Quality of Evidence  
One of the main concerns raised by the proponents of national secu-
rity courts is a possible improper disclosure of information during terror-
ism trials that may compromise national security.  Proponents argue that 
burdens are imposed on criminal courts by certain evidentiary and proce-
dural rules, and a specialized court would allow ―matters of national se-
curity [to be kept] confidential as well as to guarantee the defendants[’] 
rights to a fair trial.‖43  A central question in this context is how intelli-
gence is gathered, evaluated, and used in court proceedings.  A State may 
claim that it is necessary, in light of public interest, to interfere with in-
dividual rights by relying on information that cannot be fully revealed.   
The entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence for criminal law pur-
poses can be weighed against the State’s national security interests or the 
interests of witnesses.
44
 Nonetheless, certain criteria must be observed.  
In A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR heard a claim under 
Article 5(4), which provides for the right of every detainee to challenge 
the legality of detention in immigration cases.  The applicant argued that 
the proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
                                                                                                  
ungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20031105_2bvr124303.html?Suchbeg-riff=jemen (in 
German) (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).  T. R. Reid, Europeans Reluctant to Send Terror 
Suspects to U.S.; Allies Oppose Death Penalty and Bush’s Plan for Secret Military Tri-
bunals, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at A23. 
43 Guiora, Military Commissions and National Security Courts after Guantanamo, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 199 (2008). 
Doorson v. the Netherlands, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R., 70.   
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(SIAC)
45
 did not satisfy due process requirements because some of the 
evidence in the proceedings was not disclosed to the applicants, and the 
SIAC used special advocates with security clearances
46
 who could not 
communicate with their clients during proceedings pursuant to the UK 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.  The ECtHR assessed each of the 
complaints on a case-by-case basis.  In doing so, the Court referred to the 
SIAC as a ―fully independent court‖ 47 and did not put into question its 
impartiality. 
Standards, nevertheless, are necessary for evidence in terrorism cas-
es where classified information may play a crucial role.
48
  There are 
questions as to whether such standards can be established, whether they 
could fully comply with the ECHR’s guarantees to a fair trial, and to 
what extent the standards should deviate from ordinary criminal proceed-
ings.  The ECtHR attempted in the A and Others v the UK to develop 
certain criteria on the extent and quality of evidence needed to justify a 
preventive detention in immigration cases.  One of the problematic issues 
related to the overall fairness of proceedings was the fact that neither the 
applicants nor their legal advisers could see the classified material rele-
vant to court proceedings.  Instead, the classified material was disclosed 
to one or more special advocates, appointed by the Solicitor General to 
act on behalf of each applicant.  From the point at which the special ad-
vocate first had access to the closed material, he/she was not permitted to 
have any further contact with the applicant and his representatives, save 
for with the permission of the SIAC.  The ECtHR stated that where full 
disclosure was not possible, Article 5(4) required that the difficulties this 
caused were counterbalanced in such a way that each applicant still had 
the possibility of effectively challenging the allegations against him be-
                                            
45 The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) was set up in response to 
Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R., by the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission Act 1997 in order to provide a judicial process where the Government raised 
national security considerations about the presentation of evidence in immigration cases. 
It is a tribunal composed of independent judges, with a right of appeal against its deci-
sions on a point of law to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. 
46 CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THE OPERATION OF THE SPECIAL 
IMMIGRATION APPEALS COMMISSION (SIAC) AND THE USE OF SPECIAL ADVOCATES, 2004-
5, H.C. 323-I. 
47 A. v. United Kingdom, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 19.  
48 Doug Cassel, International Human Rights Law and Security Detention (Notre 
Dame Law Sch. Legal Research, Paper No. 08-32, 2008) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1281041. 
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fore an independent judiciary.
49
   
Further, the Court dealt with the extent to which the evidence is dis-
closed in the Court.  According to the Court, ―[w]here the evidence was 
to a large extent disclosed and the open material played the predominant 
role in the determination, it could not be said that the applicant was de-
nied an opportunity effectively to challenge the reasonableness of the 
Secretary of State's belief and suspicions about him.‖50  In other cases, 
even where all or most of the evidence remained undisclosed, if the alle-
gations contained in the open material were sufficiently specific, it should 
have been possible for the applicant to provide his representatives and 
the special advocate with information with which to refute the allegations 
without his having to know the detail or sources of the evidence which 
formed the basis of the allegations.
51
  The Court here recognized the 
wide discretion of Contracting States’ authorities to not disclose evi-
dence derived from classified information.  Where, however, the open 
material consisted purely of general assertions and the authority’s (here, 
SIAC's) decision to maintain the detention was based solely, or to a deci-
sive degree, on closed material, the procedural requirements of Article 
5(4) would not be satisfied.
52
  Thus, a judge has to take into account the 
extent to which the relevant material is disclosed and the specificity of 
the open information available to the detainees.  However, this standard 
can only be applied on a case-by-case basis.
53
 
3. Limiting the rights of defense? 
The ECHR does not require that the proceedings against individuals 
suspected of involvement in terrorism fully reflect all guarantees of a fair 
trial, but it does require that the proceedings as a whole should be fair.
  
The ECtHR has decided in the abovementioned A and Others case that 
Article 5(4) proceedings with regard to terrorism immigration cases must 
                                            
49  A., 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 218. 
50 Id. ¶ 220. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. 
53 The Court found that there was a violation of Article 5(4) in respect of four of the 
applicants who were not able to effectively challenge their detention. The rights of five 
other applicants have not been violated. Id. 212-24.   
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be conducted in accordance with the principles of procedural fairness.
54
  
While doing so, the Court emphasized that ―[a]lthough it is not always 
necessary that an Article 5 § 4 procedure be attended by the same guar-
antees as those required under Article 6… it must have a judicial charac-
ter and provide guarantees appropriate to the type of deprivation of liber-
ty in question.‖55  Owing to the ―dramatic impact of the lengthy—and 
what appeared at that time to be indefinite—deprivation of liberty,‖ the 
ECtHR held that the full level of protections accorded by Article 6(1) to 
criminal proceedings should have been guaranteed to the applicants.
56
  
This holding can be interpreted in such a way that criminal procedural 
safeguards shall adhere to special court proceedings dealing with preven-
tive security detentions under the ECHR, especially in cases of so-called 
―indefinite detention‖ of suspected terrorists.  
It has been argued that one of the effective ways to protect the inter-
ests and rights of alleged terrorists is to employ special advocates who 
have security clearance to access all information related to a given pro-
ceeding.  According to the ECtHR, ―[t]he special advocate could provide 
an important, additional safeguard through questioning the State's wit-
nesses on the need for secrecy and through making submissions to the 
judge regarding the case for additional disclosure.‖57 Nevertheless, the 
communication between the special advocates and the alleged terrorists 
must also be in line with procedural fairness:  
The Court further considers that the special advocate could perform an im-
portant role in counterbalancing the lack of full disclosure and the lack of a 
full, open, adversarial hearing by testing the evidence and putting argu-
ments on behalf of the detainee during the closed hearings. However, the 
special advocate could not perform this function in any useful way unless 
the detainee was provided with sufficient information about the allegations 
against him to enable him to give effective instructions to the special advo-
cate.58  
Furthermore, the principle of the equality of arms cannot be fully 
implemented when the judges and special advocates have access to 
closed information, but the detainees and their legal representatives do 
                                            
54 Id. ¶¶ 203, 217. 
55 Id. ¶ 203. 
56 Id. ¶ 217. 
57 Id.  ¶ 219.  
58 Id. ¶ 220. 
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not enjoy such a privilege.
59
  
The Court examined the lawfulness of the extent to which the rights 
of defense may be limited in cases involving the threats of terrorism.
60
  
Any difficulties caused to the defense by a limitation on its rights must 
be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judi-
cial authorities.
61
  The ECtHR, however, does not decide whether a non-
disclosure of evidence was strictly necessary since, as a general rule, it is 
for the national courts to assess the evidence before them.
62
  The 
ECtHR’s task is to ascertain whether the decision-making procedure ap-
plied in each case complied, as far as possible, with the requirements of 
adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated adequate 
safeguards to protect the accused’s rights.63  Generally, the accused’s 
rights must be upheld, and the manner in which the trial is conducted 
must not undermine these rights.  
Thus, it can be concluded that the far-reaching deviations from the 
ordinary guarantees of a fair trial cannot be justified by the threat of ter-
rorism; there must be compelling reasons that incapacitate the state to 
fully guarantee all relevant safeguards of criminal justice. Taking into 
account the European States’ overall reluctance to rely on emergency le-
gal regime and the actual circumstances on the ground that do not create 
a need for such reliance, the fight against terrorism in Europe will rather 
remain within the bounds of the ordinary criminal justice, especially 
when there are no real incentives to make a dangerous move into a dif-
ferent legal order where a preventive detention of suspected terrorists 
constitutes a rule while their criminal trial is rather an exception.  
IV.    THE ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC JUDICIARY: COMPROMISING 
NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE NAME OF THE RULE OF LAW? 
The recent practice of domestic civilian courts demonstrates that or-
dinary judiciary is not powerless in the face of terrorism threats.  On the 
                                            
59 ECHR, supra note 13 (noting that Article 5(2) requires that there is sufficient in-
formation for an individual to be able to challenge the reasonableness of the suspicion 
against him/her). 
60 Hulki Günes v Turkey, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 96. 
61 Van Mechelen and Other v. the Netherlands 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 58 (1997).  
62 Edwards & Lewis v. United Kingdom, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 46. 
63 Rowe & Davis v. United Kingdom, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 60-62.  
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other hand, it illustrates the limits imposed by human rights that special 
courts would face in similar situations.
64
  These problems concern the de-
tainee’s access to witnesses, standards of proof, admissibility of evi-
dence, and the use of intelligence information.  All these evidentiary 
questions are related to the central issues of how to gather and utilize 
sensitive information that may play a significant role in terrorism trials, 
what the burden of proof should be in the admissibility of certain intelli-
gence-gathering techniques, and with which party the burden of proof 
lies.   
Ordinary criminal courts have been struggling with procedural prob-
lems in terrorism trials where the intelligence information and sources 
played a decisive role in upholding the standards of a fair trial.  In 2004, 
the German High Court reconsidered the conviction of Mounir al-
Motassadeq, who was held responsible for the events of September 11, 
because of doubts about fairness of the proceedings against him.
65
  A 
central issue was the question of how a court should deal with a situation 
where persons, who may possess important information pertaining to the 
case in question, are not allowed to appear as witnesses.
66
  The court 
held that the right to a fair trial can be violated when executive authori-
ties are withholding exculpatory evidence.   
The disclosure of sensitive information can be decisive in criminal 
proceedings.  It is worth mentioning in this context that the testimony 
given by the President of the German Secret Service during the Mzoudi 
trial played a crucial role in the court’s decision to drop the terrorism 
charges against Mzoudi.  In particular, he reported secret service infor-
mation that the September 11 attacks were not planned by the Muslim 
students in Hamburg but by the leadership of the Al-Qaida terrorist net-
work in Afghanistan.
67
   
Security courts may face difficulties in determining the proper bur-
den of proof in similar situations, leaning towards deciding them on the 
                                            
64 National state secrecy rules may impose limits on ordinary courts.    
65 See Christoph Safferling, Terror and Law – Is the German Legal System Able to 
Deal with Terrorism? The Bundsgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) decision in the 
case against Motassadeq, 5 GERMAN L.J. 516 (2004). 
66 ECHR, supra note 13 (noting that the right to confront a witness is stipulated by 
Article 6(3)(d)). 
67 Loami Blaauw-Wolf, The Hamburg Terror Trials – American Political Poker and 
German Legal Procedure: An Unlikely Combination to Fight International Terrorism, 5 
GERMAN L. J. 791, 801 (2004). 
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basis of mere suspicion refuted by the government’s evidence, the relia-
bility and accuracy of which cannot be sufficiently proven.  
The fight against terrorism through means which lie outside ordi-
nary criminal justice may lead to detentions on a low burden of suspicion 
and highly unreliable (secret) evidence.
68
  For example, part 4 of the UK 
Terrorism Act of 2001 has been criticized as authorizing detention of 
suspected international terrorists on executive order and on a low burden 
of suspicion.
69
   
The ECtHR is not in a position to examine the national authorities’ 
determination that someone poses a serious security threat to the state.  
International law does not establish standards for identifying when a ter-
rorism suspect poses a sufficiently serious security threat to render an in-
dividual’s (preventive) detention non-arbitrary, and the domestic legal 
rules on the determination of dangerousness may also be vague.  This 
does not mean, however, that mere suspicion should become an effective 
yardstick for security-based detentions. Generally, any suspicion which 
constitutes a basis for detention shall be reasonable,
70
 and the detainee 
shall have the right to contest it in a competent court.  Having reasonable 
suspicion presupposes the ―existence of facts or information which 
would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have 
committed an offense.‖
71
  The ECtHR has slightly modified these stan-
dards for terrorism suspects.  According to the Court, the Government 
has to furnish ―at least some facts or information capable of satisfying 
the Court that the arrested person was reasonably suspected of having 
committed the alleged offence.  This is all the more necessary where  . . .  
the domestic law does not require reasonable suspicion, but sets a lower 
threshold by merely requiring honest suspicion.‖
72
 
                                            
68 See, e.g., Audrey Gillan, Judges Accuse Blankett Over Terror Suspect, GUARDIAN, 
Mar. 9, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/mar/09/al-qaida.september11. 
69 Colin Warbrick, The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of Human 
Rights, 15 EUR J. INT’L. L. 989, 995, 1013 (2004).  See also Opinion of the Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, On Certain Aspects of the United Kingdom 
Derogation From Article 5 Par. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Aug. 
28, 2002, CommDH(2002)7, available at  
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=980187&Site=COE.    
70 ECHR, supra note 13, lit. c. 
71 See Fox v. United Kingdom, 182 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶32; O’Hara v. United 
Kingdom, 2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 34. 
72 Fox, 182 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶32; O’Hara, 2001-X Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 35. 
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International counter-terrorist cooperation may cause additional dif-
ficulties regarding access to relevant information in terrorism trials.  The 
disclosure may be most problematic when states are aware that the inter-
rogation methods used against suspected terrorists cannot produce ad-
missible evidence.  For example, not all intelligence information for 
which the practice of torture is certified is disclosed in a court.  One may 
argue that the disclosure of sensitive information stemming from interna-
tional intelligence cooperation may damage not only the national security 
of the respective (disclosing) state but also the international effort to 
combat terrorism, and therefore such information should only be dis-
closed in a specialized security court.  
A recent U.K. case related to the illegal treatment of Binyam Mo-
hamed clearly demonstrated that there may be a conflict between the in-
terests of inter-state counterterrorist intelligence cooperation and human 
rights,
73
 and raised the question of what the proper balance should be.  In 
Mohamed,74 the U.K. court dismissed the Foreign Secretary’s claims that 
disclosing the evidence would harm national security and threaten the 
U.K.’s intelligence-sharing arrangements with the U.S.,
75
 and stated the 
following:  
In our view, as a court in the United Kingdom, a vital public interest re-
quires, for reasons of democratic accountability and the rule of law in the 
United Kingdom, that a summary of the most important evidence relating 
                                            
73 HOUSE OF LORDS/HOUSE OF COMMONS, ALLEGATIONS OF UK COMPLICITY IN 
TORTURE, 2008-2009, available at http://www.publications.parlia-
ment.uk/pa/jt200809/jtselect/jtrights/152/15202.htm.  For broader discussion on compli-
cit states, see George Nolte & Helmut Philipp Aust, Equivocal Helpers, Complicit States, 
Mixed Messages and International Law, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2009). 
74 See generally, Binyam Mohamed Torture Appeal Lost by UK Government, BBC 
NEWS, Feb. 10, 2010 [hereinafter Binyam Mohamed], 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8507852.stm;  David Miliband, Remarks on the 
Binyam Mohamed Case, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFF., Feb. 10, 2010, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=21722320; John F. Burns, 
Britain Discloses Data on Ex-Detainee, NY TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/world/europe/11brit-ain.html?ref=europe (last vis-
ited Feb. 15, 2010).  See also US Disappointed at UK Appeal Court Torture Ruling, BBC 
NEWS, Feb. 11, 2010, http://ne-ws.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8509787.stm (last visited Feb. 
15, 2010).  
75 Richard Norton-Taylor, Binyam Mohamed: Judge Overrules Attempt to Suppress 
Torture Evidence, GUARDIAN, Oct. 16, 2009, available at  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/16/binyam-mohamed-torture-evid-ence-
miliband. 
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to the involvement of the British security services in wrongdoing be placed 
in the public domain in the United Kingdom.
76
  
The Court further noted that ―the suppression of reports of wrong-
doing by officials (in circumstances which cannot in any way affect na-
tional security) would be inimical to the rule of law.‖77  The U.K. Gov-
ernment’s efforts to enforce a non-disclosure obligation in an Appeals 
Court failed.
78
 
A court in Milan, by recently convicting 23 US and Italian security 
officials who had abducted Muslim cleric Abu Omar on suspicion of 
terrorism from an open street in Milan, has shown that the barriers 
erected by the domestic law concepts of state secrecy may cause difficul-
ties to terrorism trials in civilian courts but do not always prevent them 
from undertaking their judicial function.
79
  The Italian Constitutional 
Court, while determining competencies of the branches of government in 
the area of state secrets, recognized the wide discretion of the executive 
by ruling on March 11, 2009 that any evidence of coordination between 
the Italian secret services and the C.I.A. violated state secrecy rules and 
was therefore inadmissible.
80
 At the same time, the Court indicated that 
the Milan trial of U.S. intelligence officers involved in Omar’s abduction 
may continue proceedings if all classified information is withdrawn and 
only open sources of information are presented before the court.
81
  The 
                                            
76 The Queen on the Application of Binyam Mohamed v. Secretary of State for For-
eign and Commonwealth Affairs, (2009) CO/4241/2008 (Royal Court of Justice), ¶ 105, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shar-
ed/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_10_09_mohamed_judgement.pdf. 
77 Id., ¶ 73(i)(e).  
78 John F. Burns, Britain Discloses Data on Ex-Detainee, NY TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/world/eur-
ope/11britain.html?ref=europe (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
79 Italy Convicts 23 Americans for CIA Renditions, Most Working for the CIA of Ab-
ducting Muslim Cleric, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at 15.  For a detailed discussing con-
cerning this case, see Francesco Messineo, Extraordinary Renditions’ and State Obliga-
tions to Criminalize and Prosecute Torture in the Light of the Abu Omar Case in Italy, 7 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1023-44 (2009). 
80 Conflitto di attribuzione tra potteri dello Stato (processo Abu Omar e segreto di 
stato), n.106/2009, Gazz. Uff. 1 Serie Sp. published on 8 April 2009 (decided 11 March 
2009) at 9.1.  
81 Id. at 12.3. The Court emphasized that state secrets never covered the kidnapping 
of Abu Omar which could be investigated by the competent courts according to standard 
procedures. Id.  
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Milan court indeed ruled that there was enough evidence to proceed with 
the case (As a result, not all suspects have been charged. Charges were 
dropped against five Italians because evidence against them violated 
state secrecy rules and against three Americans because of diplomatic 
immunity).
82
  
 The domestic civilian courts may prevent the lowering of standards 
regarding the conduct of intelligence gathering and the use of sensitive 
information in terrorism trials while maintaining a proper balance be-
tween national security interests and fundamental rights. At the same 
time, they cannot do away with state secrecy rules altogether.  Notwith-
standing the national authorities’ margin of appreciation in adjusting 
their criminal justice systems to contemporary security challenges, the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR can play a guiding role and shed light on 
some of the procedural difficulties with which the domestic judiciary 
may be confronted in terrorism cases. This especially concerns the need 
for an effective protection of important procedural rights even in times of 
serious security threats.   
 V.   CONCLUSION 
It is unlikely that criminal justice will be substituted by a new pro-
cedural paradigm of national security courts in Europe not least because 
of the strict requirements of the legal regime of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and also as a matter of legal policy.  It is certainly true 
that global terrorism is a serious threat to the national security of many 
European states.  However, the threat of terrorism cannot be used as a 
justification for introducing new terrorism courts with more flexible pro-
cedural underpinnings.  The use of security detention for suspected ter-
rorists is not a general practice under the Convention regime – it always 
depends on the circumstances of the case if such ―pure‖ security based 
detentions can be justified in times of national emergency.  As a matter 
of principle, terrorist activities can amount to an emergency that allow a 
                                            
82 Abu Omar, Pollari e Manicini non giudicabili. Condanne per la Cia, e gli Usa 
protestano, La Republicca, Nov. 4 2009, available at 
http://www.repubblica.it/2009/09/sezioni/cronaca/processo-abu-omar/-sentenza-abu-
omar/sentenza-abu-omar.html. Rapimento Abu Omar, Pollari e Mancini non giudicabili 
per il segreto di Stato, Corriere Della Sera, Nov. 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.corriere.it/cronache/09_novembre_04/processo-abu-omar_a6179aba-c95c-
11de-a52f-00144f02aabc.shtml. 
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state to derogate from its obligations under Article 15.  However, there is 
only one Council of Europe State which had made use of this clause so 
far since 9/11
83
, the U.K.  The effect of the House of Lord’s ruling of 
December 16, 2004 in the Belmarsh Prison Case84, however, is that de-
rogation from Article 15 requirements is invalidated.
85
  Thus, the thre-
shold for allowing detention in light of an emergency is not to be taken 
lightly. 
The ECtHR does not universally specify to what extent special pro-
cedural rules can deviate from the standards of criminal justice.
86
 Any 
such specification would be dependent on the circumstances of the case 
and on the importance of rights that are at stake.  The consistency in the 
application of procedural standards is especially important because of the 
multitude of counter-terrorist modifications to national criminal justice 
systems.  Such consistency must preclude abuse and arbitrariness in na-
tional detention policies.  The role of external accountability pursuant to 
the ECHR is crucial in this respect. 
The elaboration of national detention strategies remains largely in 
the discretion of the respective Contracting State.  Meaningful modifica-
tions to the existing criminal justice systems, if necessary, would prevent 
a Contracting State’s move into a different legal order and would not ac-
cord the terrorists the privilege of being a ―special‖ target of the State’s 
                                            
83 Turkey’s derogation from Article 5(3) of the ECHR, which was first made in the 
late 1980s, aimed at taking certain counter-terrorist measures in the southeastern part of 
the country; the latest Turkish derogation made in the early 2000s had been revoked by 
the end of 2002; Albania made a brief derogation that lasted from 10 March 1997 until 24 
July 1997.    
84 A. & Others v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, ¶ 97 (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
85 The UK derogation concerned detention provisions in the Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001 which were repealed with effect from 14th March 2005 by section 
16(2)a of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. Concerning the UK derogation and the 
―A‖ Case, see Ed Bates, A “Public Emergency Threatening the Life of the Nation”? The 
United Kingdom’s Derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights of 18 
December 2001 and the “A” Case, BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 
(2005), at 245-335.  
86 According to Hakimi, ―the legal process afforded to administrative detainees 
might reasonably deviate from a state’s own rules of criminal procedure while still being 
fundamentally fair and consistent with international law.‖ Monica Hakimi, International 
Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond Armed Conflict-Criminal 
Device, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 593, 642 (2009). 
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repressive machine.  Criminal justice allows enough flexibility in dealing 
with alleged terrorists.
87
  Preventive detention for security purposes may 
appear meaningful in some situations, but it is fraught with uncertainties 
as to the basics of procedural fairness and to the rule of law.  The prin-
ciples at stake in cases of preventive security detention are too valuable 
to be left to special security courts sitting in camera and applying du-
bious standards of procedural fairness.    
 
                                            
87  Colin Warbrick, The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of Human 
Rights, 15 EUR J. OF INT’L. L. 989, 995 (2004);  Frederic Megret, Justice in Times of Vi-
olence, 14 EUR. J. OF INT’L. L. 327, 344 (2003) (stating that ―if one does not want to judge 
terrorists before ordinary courts, because of fear of one’s own judicial system, the solu-
tion should be to try and fix that system rather than create a largely derogatory one from 
scratch.‖). See also Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe, July 11, 2002, Guide-
lines on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism, available at 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_rights/h-inf(2002)8eng.pdf. 
